Flawed Ethics

Immanuel Kant’s historical conception of morality was absolutely accurate insofar as it dealt with human relations. He argued that we must treat other human beings as ends, rather than simply as means. This argument is logical and even morally sound. Unfortunately, it says little concerning the treatment of non-human creatures. Kant’s justification for the moral treatment of human beings is human rationality. Because humans are rational creatures, it would be immoral to treat them as simply means to a desired end. The type of rationality which Kant refers to is specific to human beings and seems to separate us from other living creatures. But does the lack of rationality among non-human creatures justify treating them as means? When we abstain from harming or disrespecting a fellow human being, we don’t do so simply because of our acknowledgment of their rationality. Instead, we also acknowledge their ability to experience fear and pain. Kant’s conception of morality loses its strength here because it seems to ignore this fact. It is clear that non-human creatures can and do experience fear and pain, and this fact is ample justification for moral treatment of said creatures. Therefore, Kant’s conception of morality must be expanded to include all creatures with the ability to experience fear and pain. Indeed, rationality seems largely irrelevant in terms of moral treatment.